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RECENT DECISIONS

cisions 15 make it seem probable that our courts are attempting to
turn away from that doctrine.
Consideration of policy may be advanced both for and against
the acceptance of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in this case.
This court seems an inappropriate forum to litigate such a matter
as domicile, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction should be exercised
only when absolutely necessary and when the case is in itself absolutely justiciable. 16 However, under our system of jurisprudence
the Supreme Court must apparently be the final arbiter if two state
courts reach conflicting decisions, and the court can and will protect itself against feigned controversies. In the principal case, Mr.
Justice Stone in writing the court's opinion is careful to point out
the exceptional circumstances of this case and the fact that the court
was taking jurisdiction only because of the possibility that the total
taxes might exceed the value of the estate. However, in view of the
straining of the court to find a justiciable case in this action, it is
extremely probable that even in cases presenting different circumstances, the court would attempt to acquire jurisdiction so as to determine the domicile-unless, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests, it
abandons entirely the single-state domicile doctrine.

A.A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT-THE RIGHT
TO BEAR ARMs.-Defendants were indicted for transporting in interstate commerce, a certain firearm subject to registration and taxation
under the National Firearms Act,' without having complied with the
provisions of the Act.2 On appeal by the United States from a judgment sustaining the demurrer, held, reversed. The Act in question is
not unconstitutional since it does not interfere with the right of the
people to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amend-4
ment 3 nor does it usurp the police power reserved to the states.
United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 59 Sup. Ct. 817 (1939).
15 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S.350, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939) ; Graves et al.
v. Elliott et al., 302 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939); see (1939) 14 ST.
JoEN's L. R~v. 195.
16 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S.1, 15, 20 Sup. Ct. 251 (1900).
148 STAT. 1236, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1132-1132q (1934) ("An Act to provide for
the taxation of manufacturers, importers and dealers in certain firearms and
machine guns, to tax the sale or other disposal of such weapons, and to restrict
importation and regulate interstate commerce thereof").
2Id. at 1239, 26 U. S. C. § 1132j (1934) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person who is required to register * * * or has not in his possession a stampaffixed order * * * to ship, carry or deliver any firearm i interstate com-

merce").

3 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. II (" *** the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed").
4 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S.506, 57 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937).
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The right to bear arms was formerly considered as one of the
essential features of a democracy. 5 It is not granted by the Constitution 6 but merely guaranteed by it.7 The right has been recognized
so as to make effectual the common defense, for which purpose the
citizenry were to be banded into the militia.8 But this view has since
given way to legislative enactments prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons and the courts have held that such regulation is no
impairment of a constitutional immunity. 9 Such regulation must be
held reasonable because it is conducive to a better order in society,
and further, the function of the militia is not hindered thereby. 10
Thus it is not an invasion of the right to make it unlawful for any
person to carry a dirk, sword cane, stiletto, slungshot or similar
weapon:" since they are not the common weapons of warfare.
The instant case decided that a sawed-off shotgun is not, within
judicial notice, part of the ordinary military equipment; nor could its
use contribute to national defense. The Amendment will not be construed so as to permit unauthorized bodies of men to drill with firearms 12 even though the weapons be incapable of firing.'3 It should
be noted that any attempt to contravene the Amendment by regulation
which amounts to a destruction of the right would undoubtedly be
unconstitutional.'14
5 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1851) 1896 ("The right of the people to
keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the palladium of the liberty
of a republic").
6 United States v. Cruishank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875) ; Ex parte Rameriz, 193

Cal. 633, 226 Pac. 914 (1924) - State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S. E. 9
(1891)_; see 11 Am. JuR. (1937)

p. 1104, § 313.
7 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS (9th ed. 1927) 529.
8 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the power * * * to provide
for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia"); instant case at 818
(" * * * The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates
in the convention, the history and legislation of colonies and states, and the
writings of approved commentators. These show plainly that the militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense") ; Ex parte Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633; 226 Pac. 914 (1924) (the right of
the citizen to bear arms is limited to use in the common defense, not private
brawls) ; 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1851) § 1897.
9 Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 14 Sup. Ct. 874 (1894) ; Wilson v. State,
33 Ark. 557 (1878); People v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397, 97 N. E. 877 (1912);
Salina v. Blakesly, 72 Kan. 230, 83 Pac. 619 (1905) ; State v. Keet, 269 Mo.
206, 190 S. W. 573 (1916); State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S. E. 9
(1891). Contra: Bliss v. Comm. 2 Litt. 9 (Ky. 1822) (A later constitutional
provision expressly gave a general assembly the right to prevent persons from
carrying concealed weapons) ; In re Brickley, 8 Idaho 597, 70 Pac. 609 (1902).
10 McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1928) 13 MARQ. L. REv.
138. .1 People
v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397, 97 N. E. 877 (1912) ; English v. State,
35 Tex. 473 (1872); State v. Wilburn, 7 Baxt. 57 (Tenn. 1872); Aymette v.
State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840).
12 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580 (1886); Comm. v.
Murphy, 166 Mass. 171, 44 N. E. 138 (1896).
13 Comm. v. Murphy, 166 Mass. 171, 44 N. E. 138 (1896).
14 People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N. W. 927 (1922) ; State v. Wilfort,

74 Mo. 528 (1881).
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The Second Amendment is a limitation upon the power of Congress and not upon the states.' 5 However, since all citizens capable
of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force of the United
States, the states cannot prohibit people from bearing arms so as to
prevent them from assisting in national defense.16 The framers of
the Constitution could not have intended that their recognition of the
right to bear arms was to be perverted by wrongdoers into an aid
against societal control of crime. In a previous case upon the Act,
the Court stated that "* * * The second amendment to the Constitution * * * has no application to this act. The Constitution does not
grant the privilege to racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of
the character dealt with in the act. It refers to the militia; to the
protective force of government; to the collective body and not individual rights." 17
A. S. V.

COPYRIGHTS-RIGHT TO MAINTAIN INFRINGEMENT SUIT-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 12, COPYRIGHT ACT 1909.-

Petitioner sought an injunction, damages, etc., because of alleged
unauthorized use of a magazine article copyrighted under the Copyright Act. Petitioner published a monthly magazine and claimed
copyright by printing thereon the required statutory notice.' Subsequently, and before 2 petitioner deposited copies and received a certificate of registration, 3 respondents published and offered for general
sale a book containing material substantially identical with an article
contained in petitioner's magazine. Respondents deposited copies in
the copyright office and received a certificate of registration before
petitioner did. Its book contained usual notice of claimed-copyright
'5 United States v. Cruishank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); Presser v. Illinois,
116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580 (1886).
1 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580 (1886).
17 United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.C. Fla. 1935).

135 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 9 (1934) ("Any person entitled
thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof
with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall be
affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States
by authority of the copyright proprietor. * * * ").
2 Fourteen months elapsed between the publication and the submission of
copies for deposit in the Copyright Office and a certificate of registration
obtained * * * the respondents published and offered for sale their book six
months before the petitioner's deposit of copies and receipt of certificate of
registration.
335 STAT. 1078 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 10 (1934) ("Such person may
obtain registration of his claim to copyright by complying with the provisions of
this Act, including the deposit of copies, and upon such compliance the register
of copyrights shall issue to him the certificate provided for in section 55 of

this title").

